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BOOK REVIEW
Gideon Yaffee, Manifest Activity: Thomas Reid’s Theory of 
Action. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 158 pp.,   
$52.00 hardcover 
Gideon Yaffee’s Manifest Activity is an important contribution to both 
the studies of Thomas Reid’s views and action theory. Reid is known as an 
early advocate of an agent-causal view of free will; more recent advocates 
include Roderick Chisholm. Manifest Activity is a well-appreciated effort at 
bringing Reid’s particular version of agent-causalism and his arguments for 
it into the contemporary discussion. Manifest Activity should be of interest 
to Reid scholars, action theorists, and anyone who wants to explore a fo-
cused, critical analysis of a fascinating thinker. 
Yaffee’s writing is clear and readable, yet rigorous and detailed. Yaffee’s 
aim in each chapter is clearly laid out, and the structure of each is clear. 
Some chapters start out with a reconstruction of one of Reid’s argument, 
and then Yaffee assesses each of the premises in turn. Other chapters begin 
with an interpretive puzzle, which Yaffee solves with resources from the 
Reid corpus. At times, the dialectic gets complex, but concise summaries 
that tie the arguments together are a welcome end of each chapter. Skipping 
the footnotes is not recommended, as they often contain significant reflec-
tions, extensions, or qualifications of points in the main text, if not impor-
tant references to historical and contemporary texts. 
In his introduction, Yaffee writes that Reid takes himself to be follow-
ing the methods of Newton, according to which ‘‘the primary aim of sci-
entific inquiry is the identification of first principles’’ such as the law of 
universal gravitation (p. 3). Mathematical, empirical, and philosophical 
inquiries all have the same structure and the same goal, and first princi-
ples are all similar in certain respects. Quoting Reid, Yaffee states that the 
only support for first principles is ‘‘that, by the constitution of our nature, 
we are under a necessity of assenting to them. Such principles are parts 
of our constitution’’ (p. 4). However, so-called first principles seem like a 
very mixed lot, and it does not seem like our constitution puts us under a 
necessity of assenting to basic laws of nature. Yaffee seems aware of this, 
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mentioning in a footnote ‘‘it might seem strange to claim that for him the 
basic laws of nature are first principles. After all, basic laws are not always 
dictated by common sense’’ (p. 3). Yaffee’s only reply to this strangeness 
is that basic laws of nature like the law of universal gravitation are Reid’s 
favorite examples of the first principles of contingent truths. While Yaffee 
gives textual support for his interpretation of Reid, he never questions the 
plausibility of the view itself. Yet it is not clear that basic laws of nature 
from which particular facts follow are principles that we are compelled to 
believe, rather than elusive a posteriori truths about the world. 
The terminology that Yaffee introduces in his introduction is crucial 
to understanding his discussion of Reid’s views. A ‘‘cause in the phys-
ical sense’’ is something which, by the laws of nature, the effect always 
follows, ‘‘laws of nature’’ being rules according to which the effects are 
produced (p. 6). An ‘‘efficient cause’’ is an entity endowed with active 
power to produce an effect, or the originator of a sequence of events. A 
‘‘power’’ is a quality possessed by the entity from which change flows (p. 
7). With such terms in mind, Reid’s thesis can be put: Actions of an agent 
are events of which the agent is the efficient cause. 
In chapter 1, Yaffee considers Reid’s argument from the power to exert 
for the claim that will and understanding are necessary for active power. 
According to Reid, the only real causes are not mere instances of regular-
ities, but efficient causes, which all have minds. Following Reid, Yaffee as-
serts that this claim follows from three natural beliefs, and that the contrary 
position according to which mindless objects have active power ‘‘is shown, 
by Reid’s argument, to be unstable’’ (p. 37). Yaffee seems to be endorsing 
Reid’s argument and conclusion, which he interprets as follows: an agent 
has a power only if she has the power to exert it; an agent has the power 
to exert only if she has a will; an agent has a will only if she has an under-
standing; therefore, an agent has power only if she has a will and an under-
standing. Yaffee tries to motivate support for the first premise by looking 
at Reid’s criticisms of Thomas Hobbes’s conception of power, according to 
which an agent has a power to act if and only if, if she chooses to act, then 
she acts. Reid’s criticism of Hobbes’s conception of power is a variant of a 
standard criticism of compatibilism: that an action cannot be in the agent’s 
power if the choice to perform that action is not also within his power. This 
criticism suggests that an agent has the power to perform an action only if 
the agent in question has the power to choose to perform the action, which 
may be some reason for believing the first premise of the argument. 
Perhaps Yaffee shows that Reid’s criticism of Hobbes supports the first 
premise of the argument from the power to exert or that Reid’s particular 
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variant is an improvement on the standard criticism. However, whether 
Hobbes’s conception of power or his critic’s conception of power is cor-
rect, both of them suppose that the entity with power is an agent, capable 
of making choices. Yaffee’s aim is to show that Reid shows that there is no 
power without a mind. But the defense of the first premise of the argument 
from the power to exert considered by Yaffee presupposes that the power 
in question is that of an agent. Showing that one conception of what it is 
for an agent to have power is superior to another conception of what it is 
for an agent to have power does not go towards showing that only agents 
can have power. Furthermore, Reid uses the term ‘‘exertion’’ to refer to the 
feeling of effort. Consequently, the first premise of the argument from the 
power to exert is based on the assumption that a thing with power expe-
riences a feeling, which is question begging in the context of an argument 
against the claim that mindless entities can have power. 
The argument for the second premise of the argument from the power 
to exert, which we can call the conceivability argument, raises similar con-
cerns. Yaffee’s construction of the conceivability argument proceeds as 
follows: our only conception of exertion derives from the consciousness of 
our own exertions; all of our own exertions are volitions; we are unable to 
conceive of intellectual powers different in kind from the powers we pos-
sess; an active power would be different in kind from those we possess if 
the exertion of it did not consist in volition; there are no active powers dif-
ferent in kind from those which we are able to conceive; therefore, all ex-
ertions of active power are volitions. 
Let us consider the third premise of the conceivability argument, that we 
are unable to conceive of intellectual powers different in kind from those 
we possess. Again, the contrast is between our intellectual powers and a 
different kind of intellectual power. If ‘‘intellectual’’ is used in a sense that 
does not presuppose a mind, that sense is not mentioned. What is incon-
ceivable, according to the premise, is a different kind of intellectual power, 
not a non-intellectual power. The possibility of something without a mind 
having power is not directly considered, let alone refuted. 
Yaffee writes that the first, fourth, and fifth premises of the conceiv-
ability argument are relatively unproblematic and gives them little discus-
sion. He says that the first premise of the conceivability argument is an 
upshot of David Hume’s lesson about causation, that we never perceive 
power, only constant conjunctions between types of events. What Yaffee 
fails to note is that Hume explicitly rejects the view that we can derive a 
conception of power from our own exertions. There too, we observe only 
constant conjunctions, in this case of feelings of exertion and bodily move-
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ments. Yaffee says nothing of Hume’s direct challenge to Reid’s view of 
manifest activity. 
Yaffee finds support for the fifth premise of the conceivability argument, 
that there are no active powers different in kind from those we are able to 
conceive, in Reid’s view that inconceivability implies impossibility. Accord-
ing to Reid, things which people are, by nature, incapable of conceiving are 
impossible. However, regardless of Reid’s endorsement, the fifth premise of 
the conceivability argument and the principle supporting it are not unprob-
lematic. As Thomas Nagel argues, perhaps we cannot conceive of what it is 
like to navigate through the world with echolocation. However, it would be 
wrong to conclude that it is impossible for a creature to navigate through 
the world with echolocation. Our inability to conceive of space as having 
other than three dimensions does not show that string theory could not pos-
sibly be true. Yet possibly, such phenomena are things, which our nature as 
human beings excludes us from being able to conceive. 
Yaffee suggests that there is some evidence that Reid’s argument for sec-
ond premise of the argument from the power to exert is rooted in thoughts 
about the inherently subjective nature of mental experience. Arguably, we 
cannot know what the subjective experiences of others are like. We only 
know the nature of experiences we have had, and know nothing of the na-
ture of unfamiliar experiences. If unfamiliar experiences are inconceivable, 
and the inconceivable is impossible, then unfamiliar experiences are impos-
sible. By parity of reasoning, we cannot know what it is like not to have ex-
perience at all. We cannot experience non-experience. Perhaps Reid’s argu-
ment is that since we know what it is like to efficiently cause something, 
and we cannot know what it is like to be a mindless object efficiently caus-
ing something, mindless objects cannot be efficient causes. However, if the 
conceivability argument proves anything, it proves too much. We know 
what it feels like to fall. We cannot know what it feels like to be a falling 
stone. But such necessary ignorance does not show that stones cannot fall. 
Perhaps Reid’s argument, as Yaffee interprets it, could be restated be 
saying that: we have an idea of efficient causation; the source of this idea 
was either external events or our own volitions; external events could not 
have been the source of our idea; therefore, the source of our idea of ef-
ficient causation was our own volitions; our conception of our own vo-
litions essentially includes subjective experience of exertion; therefore, 
our idea of efficient causation essentially includes the subjective experi-
ence of exertion. A subjective experience of exertion requires will and un-
derstanding. If successful, this argument supports the conclusion that our 
idea of efficient causation is of something that requires will and under-
standing. It falls short of showing that efficient causation requires will and 
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understanding. A relation between entities in the world might not be con-
strained by our ability to conceive of them. Furthermore, it is not clear 
that our ability to conceive of efficient causation be so constrained, and 
that the content and applicability of an idea must be limited by its source. 
If the source of our idea of efficient causation is our own volitions, we can 
extrapolate from that, leaving out the subjective, intellectual part, and ap-
plying the concept to inanimate matter. 
In chapter 2, Yaffee explores a different argument for the claim that ef-
ficient causes must have will and understanding: the argument from the 
power to do otherwise. According to the argument from the power to do 
otherwise, power to perform and action requires the power not to per-
form that action, and that requires a will. The major premise of the argu-
ment from the power to do otherwise is that, if an agent has the power to 
perform an action, then she has the power not to perform it. This prem-
ise is defended against Locke’s counterexample of a man who freely stays 
in a room, unaware that he could not leave if he wanted to. The reply is 
roughly that, even in this case, the person has the power to try to perform 
the action. 
In the case of persons, the premise that an agent with a power to act 
has a power not to act has some plausibility. However, this premise does 
not seem to apply to mindless things. For example, acid does not have the 
power to not turn litmus paper pink. But that does seem to support the 
claim that acid does not have the power to turn litmus paper pink. Again, 
Yaffee considers a debate over the powers of agents, and the possibility of 
mindless power does not enter the discussion. This absence is odd, since 
this is just this possibility, which is supposed to be refuted in chapters 1 
and 2. Perhaps there is some kind of first cause argument that supports 
the idea that only agents can originate event sequences, that is, be efficient 
causes. Perhaps the idea of a mindless event or object originating a se-
quence of events is incoherent. But those arguments are not found in Man-
ifest Activity. 
In chapter 3, Yaffee argues that Reid shows that all events are efficiently 
caused; that every event is brought about by an entity with active power. 
These events include human actions, efficiently caused by people, and nat-
ural events, efficiently caused by God. Yaffee does not question Reid’s view 
that events, which are physically caused, that is, which happen in accor-
dance with a law, are efficiently caused by the author of that law. Yet Yaffee 
notes that Reid acknowledges that it is one thing operate in accordance with 
laws and another thing to be caused. It follows that it is one thing to set up 
the laws, and another to initiate the events, which occur in accordance with 
those laws. If a pawn moves a space during a chess game, the author of 
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the rules of chess seems like a distant causal factor at best, rather than the 
power behind that move. Part of Reid’s view discussed by Yaffee in chap-
ter 3 is that all events serve the ends of some creature. Either people are act-
ing to serve their own ends, or God set up the laws to serve the ends of His 
creation. Central to this picture is a belief in divine providence. Yaffee never 
defends this belief, nor offers an argument for the existence of God, which 
is necessary to support Reid’s causal picture of the world. It is fine to place 
Reid’s views in the context in which they were offered, consistent with his 
larger belief system. However, it is less clear what these arguments have to 
offer people with secular world views. 
In chapter 4, Yaffee considers Reid’s argument for the claim that human 
beings are efficient causes of their actions that derives from the observation 
that people make and execute plans. To make and execute plans, an indi-
vidual must adopt a principle of behavior, and act in accordance with it. Be-
ing the author of the rule he follows, an agent is an efficient cause of his be-
havior. However, this argument rests on the same questionable principle 
which shows God to be the efficient cause of all physically caused events: 
that the author of a rule is the cause of events which happen in accordance 
with the rule. 
In chapters 5 and 6, Yaffee provides responses to the view that people do 
not cause actions, but motives do. In chapter 5, Yaffee addresses Reid’s ar-
gument against the view that motives are efficient causes of action. Reid’s 
argument is roughly that: a motive is a state of affairs that an action is aim-
ing towards; typically, if that state of affairs ever exists, it does not exist un-
til after the agent performs the action; something that does not exist when 
the event occurs cannot be the efficient cause of that event; therefore, mo-
tives are not efficient causes of actions. 
A proponent of the view that motives efficiently cause actions could re-
ject Reid’s definition of motives as states of affairs that actions are aiming 
toward and instead claim motives are prior thoughts about such states of 
affairs. Beyond the linguistic issue, an adversary of Reid’s could restate his 
view as: thoughts about the end in virtue of which an action is performed 
are the efficient causes of actions. Furthermore, it is not clear why Reid does 
not use the resources Yaffee discusses in the first two chapters of Manifest 
Activity for a quicker and more intuitive argument against the view that 
motives cause actions. If Reid has indeed shown that an efficient cause 
must have will and understanding, a motive, construed either as an end or 
a thought about that end, is not the sort of thing that could be an efficient 
cause. If the arguments in chapters 1 and 2 are correct, there is no need to 
delve into the obscure discussion about the non-existence of abstract enti-
ties we find in chapter 5. 
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In chapter 6, Yaffee discusses Reid’s arguments for the claim that mo-
tives are not among the physical causes of human action; that there are no 
laws of nature covering motives and human actions. The first argument, 
that there is no non-trivial yet accurate way to specify any laws governing 
human behavior, comprises perhaps the most interesting and well-argued 
part of Manifest Activity, and is well worth reading for anyone concerned 
with action theory, free will, or the like. Reid also argues that motives are 
not necessary for actions, and that the influence of a motive is like the influ-
ence of advice, and both are unlike the influence of physical causes. Here, 
Reid adopts the view that motives are thoughts about ends, not the ends 
themselves. Reid’s view is more subtle than Yaffee originally states. There 
are laws that govern some human actions, since a person who exhibits a 
character trait acts in accordance with a rule. It is more correct to say that, 
on Reid’s view, the only laws governing an agent’s behavior are the laws 
that the agent legislates. 
In his concluding chapter, Yaffee defends the position that Reid is an agent 
causalist who maintains that there is a basic causal relation between agents 
and events. Some philosophers might hold this position to stop an infinite 
regress of acts. If an agent’s overt behavior was caused by some prior event 
of the agent’s making an effort, and that event was caused by the agent try-
ing to act, which was in turn caused by some previous state, and that chain of 
events will extend back, prior to the history of the agent, or stop somewhere, 
not at an event, but at the agent herself. However, according to Yaffee, Reid 
equates an agent’s trying with the agent’s doing, in the case where the agent 
successfully acts. However, in the case where the agent fails to carry out her 
intended action, the agent merely tried, but did not do. 
To assess this view, let us consider the man who wants to exit a room 
and does. His trying to leave the room is the same act as his leaving the 
room. Let us also consider a perfect duplicate of the man who wants to exit 
the room, but is blocked at the last minute by invisible bars. The duplicate 
has the same intentions and performs the same bodily movements as the 
man who successfully exits the room. Their tryings are perfectly similar, 
but the duplicate’s trying is not also a doing. It seems to follow from Reid’s 
view, as Yaffee interprets it, that two instances of behavior could be intrin-
sic duplicates, but differ with respect to whether they are doings. 
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